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MARKET

entered into alliance with his government. But the piety, learning, seriousness, and political quietism of Aya-

tollah Khii'l gained him a broad international following
and, consequently, control of immense wealth. This he
administered with a quiet institutio11-building skill. Living in Najaf, his indifference to political power was always interpreted as distaste for the Iraqi leader, Saddam
Hussein, and may have become active opposition during

the Shi'i revolt in southern Iraq which followed the Gulf
War of r990-r99r. His institutional legacy lies in an
extraordinary

international

network

of

mosques,

schools, libraries, and other charitable institutions,
which, through his rulings, have been integrated into
the existing structures of national and international bodies, from London and New York to Bombay, Islamabad, Malaysia, and Thailand. How this will survive is
still uncertain. The enduring legacy of his thought is
likewise uncertain, but markedly pragmatic and eirenic,

it might turn Out to be more significant for the needs of
the Shi'l community in the twenty-first century than
that of Khomeini.
[See also Ayatollah; Ithna 'Asharlyah; Najaf; Qom;
Shl'l Islam; and the biographies of Borujerdi, Kho'i, and
Khomeini.]

Legal Foundations and Modern Practice. For related discussions, see Family Law; Mut'ah; Polygyny; Women
and Islam, article on Role and Status of Women.]

Legal Foundations
The Qur'an is the foundation of all Islamic laws, including laws of marriage and divorce. Where a matter is not

addressed specifically there, or where the application of
a verse to a certain situation permits several reasonable
interpretations, jurists look to the sunnah of the Prophet
(including /µldfth) for additional guidance. Where neither the Qur'an nor sunnah address a matter explicitly,
jurists resort to ijtihiid, a system of reasoning and inter-

pretation for which they have articulated several basic
principles. Chief among these is the principle that laws
vary with time, place, and circumstance. This principle

was adopted to emphasize the fact that Islam is a religion for all times and all people, and that therefore each
culture is permitted, within the bounds of Qur'anic injunctions, to have a reasonable degree of flexibility in
interpreting and applying Islam to its own community.
The ijtihiid of jurists on matters of marriage and divorce was significantly influenced by their milieu. Often
local gender, class, and political preferences filtered into
Islamic consciousness and were incorporated as part of
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regional Islamic legal tradition.
Originally, Muslim family law was not codified.
Judges who were faced with an issue relied directly on
the Qur'an and ~adith and, where necessary, on their
own ijtihiid. As the schools of legal thought gained
prominence, Muslim states began selecting the jurispru-

dence of one of these schools as the basis of their legal
systems. There are significant jurisprudential differences not only among the schools, but also among scholars within each school.
Most Muslim countries today have codified their family laws. In each case, the code was based primarily on
the jurisprudence of a single school; however, for a variety of reasons, a code sometimes combined this juris-

prudence with that of other schools. Such an approach,
wht>n consistent and orooerlv reasoned, is fully permis-
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view has survived to the present in most Muslim countries, although recently it has again become the subject
of debate. The barring of women from judicial positions, however, has significantly affected the development of Islamic jurisprudence, especially in the area of
family law. Despite their differences, the various
schools appear to base their jurisprudence on a traditional patriarchal view of males as rational, courageous,
and firm and of females as emotional, weak, and rash.
Consequently, many of the laws have been justified explicitly on this basis, although exceptions do exist.
For example, the major schools (Malik!, I:Ianbali,
I:lanafi, Shafi'i and Ja'fari) generally agree that a Muslim woman needs a wall (guardian, usually her father)
to enter into a marriage, but they disagree significantly
as to the extent, nature, and duration of the wali.'s authority. Most major schools agree that a father acting as
wali can force his virgin daughter to marry a man of his
choice, regardless of her age. This position was justified
on the basis that virgins lack experience in men and may
be subject to emotion in making their marriage decision.
However, if a father declares his daughter mature or if
she was previously married, then under the Maliki view
the daughter cannot be forced into marriage regardless
of her age; in that case she must reach the marriage decision jointly with her waif.
A well-established I:Ianafi line of thought views the
mature woman who has reached puberty as capable of
contracting her own marriage, with the waif playing a
merely advisory role. However, if the woman ignores
the wali's advice and marries someone "unsuitable,"
then the wall immediately acquires remarkable powers.
He can move to void the marriage if no pregnancy has
occurred. I:Ianafis and Malikis imbued the notion of
"suitability" with culturally based class distinctions that
were not present in its original articulation, which was
based on piety.
Ja'faris view a mature woman who has reached puberty, whether a virgin or otherwise, as a full legal entity coequal with her male counterpart. She is considered legally competent to make her own marriage

avoidance of the marriage of a daughter who has
reached majority. The Moroccan Personal Status Code
(1957), which is basically Maliki, departs from the traditional Maliki position by prohibiting a wall from forcing
his female ward into marriage, whether she is virgin or
otherwise, if she has attained the age of majority. It
does, however, instruct the woman to delegate her right
to contract a marriage to her waif. Malik! and other jurists have explained the need for such delegation as emanating from a desire to shield the woman from the indignity of being present among men to negotiate and
execute her own marriage contract.
The Tunisian Personal Status Code (1956, as
amended), which is also basically Maliki, departs more
fundamentally from such juri~prudence by abandoning
the notion of wall altogether and adopting a position
akin to that of the J a'faris. Once the prospective parties
reach the age of majority, they may contract their own
marriage or delegate that power to another, at their option. The consent of both husband and wife is required
for a valid marriage, and the notion of "suitability" is
absent from the code.
All schools of thought have interpreted the Qur'an as
permitting polygyny as long as certain conditions of fairness are observed. The Tunisian code prohibits it. This
prohibition, along with other departures like the ones
discussed above, has been viewed by many as a reflection of Western colonial influences. Tunisian jurists in
fact relied on the Qur' an and other basic sources in developing their arguments for prohibiting polygyny, but
it is probably true that their desire to reexamine past
ijtihlid on this issue was motivated by external Western
influences. Still, even under a traditional analysis of polygyny, there are legal approaches that enable a woman
to guard against it in her own marriage.
One such method is for the woman to specify in the
marriage contract that her prospective husband may not
marry a second wife. Unfortunately, the validity of this
condition varies with the school. Ja'faris and Shilfi'is,
for example, reject it as, respectively, contrary to Islamic law and contrary to marital rights flowing from
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the marriage contract; but in either case, both schools
view the rest of the contract as valid. This result is quite
harsh for a woman bent on protecting her marriage
from polygyny.
J:Ianafis also regard this condition as null and void;
but as an inducement for women to marry, they recognize the validity of a condition in the marriage contract
that reserves for the woman the right to divorce her husband at her option. Malikis accept the condition not to
take a second wife as valid, but they discourage it. The
condition giving the woman the right to divorce is also
acceptable to them, but it is so bound to various formal
and procedural requirements that it is hard for the average woman not to forfeit (or even fail initially to acquire) such right inadvertently. In all jurisdictions, a
woman may obtain divorce by giving up her dower
(khul'), quite a hardship for a woman of modest means.
She can also request a judicial divorce, which can be a
lengthy procedure.
The attitude of one line of thought among J:lanbalis
toward a marriage condition preventing the husband
from taking a second wife is closest to that of the
Prophet, who stated that one's 'uhi.id (promises or undertakings) must be fulfilled and that the 'uhiid most
worthy of fulfillment are those of the marriage contract.
Not only do J:Ianbalis view as valid this and all other
conditiops which are not incompatible with Islamic law
or the object of marriage; they also signal the seriousness of violating such 'uhi.id by giving the party
whose marriage condition has been violated the option
of voiding the marriage (faskh). By contrast, l;lanafis,
for example, specify a limited monetary remedy for
such violations.
Other laws relating, for example, to murah marriage
(a form of temporary marriage accepted by Shi'is),
spousal maintenance, the ability of the wife to work outside her home, the role of the husband in the family,
the duties of the wife in a marriage, and child custody,
have posed challenging questions to Muslim jurists in
modern societies. In response, a movement to reinvigorate ijtihiid and modernize family law in accordance with
the Qur'an and sunnah is taking root around the Mus-
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Modern Practice
Rules and procedures regarding marriage and divorce
are stipulated in the Qur'an and regulated through the
sharicah. Laws relating to marriage and divorce are thus
part of the body of Islamic personal status law, the only
aspect of shari'ah law that has been retained nearly intact at the close of the twentieth century.
Marriage in Islamic law is formalized by a contract
(nikii}J) between the legal guardian of the bride-always
a male and usually the bride's father-and the prospec1
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